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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2989 
___________ 
 
SEAN DAVID WOODSON, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BRIAN PAYTON 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil No. 1:12-cv-00302) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sue L. Robinson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
September 27, 2012 
 
Before: RENDELL, HARDIMAN and COWEN, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Opinion filed: November 2, 2012) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Sean David Woodson, a federal detainee currently being held at FDC 
Philadelphia, appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the District of 
Delaware dismissing his pro se civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
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Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the 
District Court’s order.  See
 Because we write primarily for the parties, we need only recite the facts necessary 
for our discussion.  In submissions to the District Court, Woodson alleges that Payton 
violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures on 
October 9, 2009.  On that date, Woodson had reported to Payton, his probation officer in 
Delaware, for a regularly scheduled meeting.  Payton had received notification that 
Woodson had charges pending against him in Maryland and took Woodson into custody.  
Payton confiscated an open pack of cigarettes from Woodson and found a number of 
Percocet pills in that pack.  Payton then received permission from his supervisor to search 
Woodson’s vehicle and recovered a loaded revolver, drug paraphernalia, and several bags 
of marijuana.  Woodson was subsequently indicted in a one-count indictment for being a 
felon in possession of a firearm.
 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
1
 In March 2012, Woodson filed this civil rights action against Payton,
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1 Woodson was subsequently tried and found guilty of being a felon in possession of a 
firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) & 922(e) on January 7, 2011.  (United 
States v. Woodson, D. Del. Crim. No. 1:09-cr-117, Docket #111.)  However, the District 
Court granted Woodson’s motion for a new trial (Id., Docket #157), and Woodson is 
currently detained pending said trial. 
 and the 
District Court granted Woodson’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis.  On July 5, 2012, 
 
2 We note that this is not the first civil rights action Woodson has filed against Payton.  In 
2010, Woodson filed a nearly identical complaint against Payton.  (See Woodson v. 
Payton,  D. Del. Civ. No. 1:10-cv-925, Docket #2.)  On February 1, 2011, the District 
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the District Court entered a Memorandum Order dismissing Woodson’s complaint as 
frivolous and malicious pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b)(1).  
Woodson then timely filed this appeal. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal order.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  We may affirm the District Court on any basis supported 
by the record.  Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations 
omitted).  Pleadings and other submissions by pro se litigants are subject to liberal 
construction.  Higgs v. Att’y Gen.
 A complaint pursuant to § 1983 is “characterized as a personal injury claim and 
thus is governed by the applicable state’s statute of limitations for personal-injury 
claims.”  
, 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011). 
Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Cito v. 
Bridgewater Twp. Police Dep’t, 892 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1989)); see also Wilson v. 
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985).  In Delaware, § 1983 claims are subject to Delaware’s 
two-year statute of limitations on personal injury actions.  Johnson v. Cullen, 925 F. 
Supp. 244, 248 (D. Del. 1996); see also
 While state law governs the applicable statute of limitations, federal law controls 
the issue of when a § 1983 claim accrues.  
 Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8119.  Therefore, 
Woodson’s complaint is subject to this two-year period. 
Wallace v. Kato
                                                                                                                                                  
Court dismissed this complaint as frivolous pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 
1915A(b)(1).  (Id., Docket #12.)  Woodson did not appeal this dismissal. 
, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007).  
4 
 
Accrual occurs “when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.”  Id.
[I]n order to recover damages for . . . harm caused by actions whose 
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 
plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on 
direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state 
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a 
federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 
 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  For purposes of § 1983 claims, the 
Supreme Court has held that  
 
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).  However, the Heck Court did not 
address the question of whether a § 1983 claim is cognizable if its success would imply 
the invalidity of a future conviction.  Furthermore, Heck requires courts to make a fact-
based inquiry to determine whether Heck applies to a Fourth Amendment claim.  See 
Heck
 Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7. 
Wallace, this Court held that a claim that, 
if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of a potential conviction on a 
pending criminal charge was not cognizable under § 1983.  Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108, 
113 (3d Cir. 1996), abrogated by Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384.  However, in Wallace, 
the Supreme Court expressly declined to hold that “an action which would impugn an 
anticipated future conviction cannot be brought until that conviction occurs and is set 
aside.”  Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393.  Therefore, the cause of action accrues “‘when the 
wrongful act or omission results in damages.’”  Id. at 391(citation omitted).  For example, 
the statute of limitations for a claim “seeking damages for a false arrest in violation of the 
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Fourth Amendment, where the arrest is followed by criminal proceedings, begins to run 
at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process.”  Id. at 397; see also 
Dique, 603 F.3d at 185-86 (determining that the cause of action accrues when the 
complainant indisputably knows about the faults of the search); Dominguez v. Hendley
 Here, Woodson’s  § 1983 claim accrued when the search and seizure occurred on 
October 8, 2009—in other words, the moment that Woodson indisputably knew about the 
alleged faults of the search and seizure.  
, 
545 F.3d 585, 589 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Fourth Amendment claims for false arrest or 
unlawful searches accrue at the time of (or termination of) the violation.”). 
See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 397; Dique, 603 F.3d at 
185-86.  However, Woodson did not file his complaint until March 7, 2012,3
 Furthermore, we see no reason to toll the statute of limitations.  Unless 
inconsistent with federal law, state law governs the issue of whether a statute of 
limitations period should be tolled.  
 well outside 
the limitations period. 
Wilson, 471 U.S. at 269; Dique
                                              
3 The “mailbox rule” governs the computation of time for complaints filed by pro se 
inmates.  See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988).  While Houston dealt 
specifically with the filing of a habeas appeal, this Court has extended the Houston 
decision to other prisoner filings.  See Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 112 (3d Cir. 
1998).  Here, Woodson signed his complaint on February 28, 2012, but he did not 
execute the certificate of service until March 7, 2012.  Therefore, it appears that 
Woodson did not deliver his complaint to prison authorities for filing until March 7, 
2012, and this Court deems his complaint filed on that date. 
, 603 F.3d at 185.  In 
Delaware, a statute of limitations may be tolled if the “injury is inherently unknowable 
and the claimant is blamelessly ignorant of the wrongful act and the injury complained 
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of.”  Coleman v. Pricewaterhousecoopers, LLC, 854 A.2d 838, 842 (Del. 2004).  In this 
case, the statute of limitations begins to run “upon the discovery of facts constituting the 
basis of the cause of action or the existence of facts sufficient to put a person of ordinary 
intelligence and prudence on inquiry which, if pursued, would lead to the discovery of 
such facts.”  Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Here, Woodson’s 
own allegations reveal that he was aware of his claim on October 8, 2009, the date of the 
allegedly unlawful search and seizure.  Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that 
Woodson’s complaint is time-barred.4  See Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 297 (3d Cir. 
2002) (“As a general proposition, sua sponte dismissal is inappropriate unless the basis is 
apparent from the face of the complaint.”); see also Fogle v. Pierson
                                              
4 The District Court correctly chose not to stay Woodson’s civil suit during the pendency 
of his criminal case.  In Wallace, the Supreme Court noted, “If a plaintiff . . . files any . . . 
claim related to rulings that will likely be made in a pending or anticipated criminal 
trial[], it is within the power of the district court . . . to stay the civil action until the 
criminal case . . . is ended.”  Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393-94; see also Bailey v. Ness, 733 
F.2d 279, 283 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 193 
(2d Cir. 1980)) (“[T]he better course in situations where the district court feels compelled 
to abstain is to stay, rather than dismiss, the § 1983 action so that the plaintiff is protected 
from a possible statute of limitations bar to the § 1983 suit.”).  However, Woodson’s 
complaint was already time-barred at the time of filing, and so a stay by the District 
Court would not have protected him. 
, 435 F.3d 1252, 
1258 (10th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted) (“A complaint may be dismissed sua sponte 
under § 1915 based on an affirmative defense—such as statute of limitations—‘only 
when the defense is obvious from the face of the complaint and no further factual record 
is required to be developed.’”). 
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For the foregoing reasons, no substantial question is presented and we will affirm 
the judgment of the District Court.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  Woodson’s 
motion for summary reversal is denied. 
